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Investigation details safety lapses at Los Alamos National Laboratory
This on Searchlight New Mexico.
In a windowless corridor of PF-4, the Los Alamos National Laboratory鈥檚 plutonium processing facility, the deputy director of weapons stood among a cluster of journalists and National Nuclear Security Administration officials, all clad in anti-contamination lab coats and booties, safety goggles and dosimeters.
鈥淚t鈥檚 not that scary,鈥� said Robert Webster, during a rare media tour of several rooms brimming with glove boxes, some almost as old as the Cold War-era building itself, others newly installed. 鈥淵ou just have to be careful.鈥�
In these highly classified rooms, each task is the sum of its many protocols, a meticulous choreography that was palpable on a recent morning 鈥� June 22 鈥� even in the absence of workers. The respirators, protective clothing, ventilation systems and dosimeters 鈥� fail-safes aimed, according to officials, at reducing or detecting the risk of exposure 鈥� are routine and required controls at 鈥渢he plant,鈥� as PF-4 is popularly known. Here, no task can be taken for granted and no movement unintended.
Five years ago, LANL began embarking on a controversial mission 鈥� to produce an annual quota of plutonium pits, the triggers for nuclear weapons. Matt Johnson, head of the lab鈥檚 Pit Technologies division, as 鈥減robably one of the safest places in New Mexico.鈥�
A recent portrays another version of the plant, a place cited for its 鈥渟ignificant lack of attention or carelessness鈥� in protecting workers and the public, as a . Released on May 18, the findings detailed four 鈥渘uclear safety events鈥� that took place over a five-month period in 2021, including one glove box breach, two floods, and an instance in which too much fissionable material was placed in one area.
The NNSA, as a result, withheld nearly $1.5 million from its 2021 contract award to Triad National Security, the organization that manages and operates the lab. (The NNSA, nonetheless, refrained from exacting additional civil penalties, which could have totaled an extra half a million dollars.)
Its 11-page report revealed an environment in which workers were either too underqualified to perform certain tasks or overburdened by too many tasks to perform them well. Another problem stemmed from faulty equipment, which had presented problems since 1990 and had not been replaced under Triad鈥檚 tenure, despite multiple requests.
The report emphasized that Triad routinely focused on 鈥渉uman errors rather than on the conditions that make those errors more likely.鈥�
That particular oversight, in part, led to water entering a ventilation system for multiple rooms and glove boxes 鈥� the windowed, stainless-steel containers where radioactive materials are handled. According to the NNSA, it amounted to a violation of 鈥渃riticality safety requirements.鈥� Water has long been known to enhance fission and, in certain circumstances, cause plutonium to go critical, sending out a blast of blue light and radiation.
The four nuclear safety events cited by the NNSA represented only a small fraction of the many 鈥減rocess deviations鈥� and compliance concerns around handling nuclear materials that have beset the plant since May 2018. That鈥檚 the same year the as one of two sites in the country to produce plutonium pits for nuclear warheads.
In an attempt to understand a fuller picture of risks at the plant, Searchlight New Mexico culled through the last five years of weekly reports by the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board (DNFSB), a federal watchdog that oversees the U.S. nuclear weapons complex and makes recommendations to the Department of Energy. An analysis like this has never been conducted before, according to the DNFSB.
Searchlight counted at least 100 process deviations at the plant during that period: a mix of safety incidents, emergency events and protocol violations. The examples were wide ranging 鈥� from construction accidents and small fires, to floods and worker contamination. Not all had the potential to be catastrophic, but at a facility like PF-4, the consequences can be much higher than in other workplaces.
In 2019, by a 320-pound toxic nuclear waste container and, in 2020, another inhaled plutonium oxide powder 鈥� the most dangerous form of plutonium. There was a broken finger, a mysterious head injury and several instances in which containers of , up to 80 at one point, in a single storage room. The all-important protective gloves inside the glove boxes have on occasion become separated from their ports in the box wall; they鈥檝e also torn on sharp objects or been worn down by tools or overuse. The DNFSB called glove box glove failures and floods 鈥渞epeat events鈥� 鈥� serious incidents they attribute to 鈥減oor conduct of operations.鈥� Records show at least 20 such incidents in the last five years that resulted in several instances of skin contamination, though only two reports indicated an 鈥渦ptake鈥� 鈥� an absorption of plutonium into the body.
鈥淣NSA is investing billions of dollars in production-related infrastructure at Los Alamos,鈥� a DNFSB spokesperson wrote in an email to Searchlight, 鈥渁nd the Board is continuing to urge commensurate investment in the safety infrastructure needed to ensure workers and the public are adequately protected from potential accidents at PF-4.鈥�
In the June 2020 , the worker underwent chelation therapy for significant radiation 鈥� on hair, skin and by inhalation 鈥� when he 鈥減ulled out of the glovebox gloves after weighing and packaging plutonium-238 oxide powder.鈥� As a soluble form of plutonium, oxide powder can begin to circulate in the bloodstream almost immediately and eventually end up in the liver and bones, . Fourteen other workers were also exposed in that same incident.
Searchlight found other incidents that could be considered outliers. In July 2021, for example, a hit some 30 miles northwest of the lab, located within the Pajarito Fault System.
The plant鈥檚 new glove boxes have been built to withstand an earthquake, according to the DNFSB. But, there are 鈥渁 large number of existing gloveboxes that do not meet current seismic standards,鈥� the agency鈥檚 email to Searchlight made clear.
The worst possible scenario would be a cataclysmic earthquake that triggers a fire at the plant. For almost two decades, the DNFSB has argued that the building鈥檚 鈥減assive confinement system鈥� 鈥� essentially its capacity to prevent a release of radioactive material from leaking out and reaching the public 鈥� is insufficient. After years of back and forth on the matter, and to the plant, the NNSA, in 2022, deemed significant upgrades, including to the ventilation system, were unnecessary 鈥� despite DNFSB鈥檚 to the contrary.
Another occurred in February 2019, when two electricians were 鈥渋nadvertently locked inside a caged storage location鈥� for 40 minutes. 鈥淒uring this time,鈥� the DNFSB reported, 鈥渢he workers would have been unable to properly respond to alarms associated with a nuclear criticality, an airborne radioactive material release, fire, or other emergency situations requiring egress.鈥�
When asked about a recent spate of glove box and other safety matters at the plant, the lab responded with the following statement:
鈥淧F-4 is one of the safest places in the country as a result of the many redundant safety and security measures in place to protect our workforce, the environment, and the community. We have ongoing programs to ensure the safe handling of materials at TA-55. In the case of glove box breaches, training and controls identified the breaches and allowed us to address them immediately. Employees鈥� personal protective equipment and the facility and room ventilation systems help keep workers safe at all times.鈥�
Searchlight鈥檚 counts are based on the findings of site inspectors and confirmed by the DNFSB. While there could be many reasons behind an incident, site inspectors categorized the events according to a complex set of procedures. The number of reported incidents in 2022 rose by 33 percent compared to the previous year. In 2022, Triad commenced round-the-clock operations.
