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When New Mexicans awoke on June 11, 1991, they saw a picture on the front page of that day鈥檚 Journal. The picture showed a scene from a ticker-tape parade in New York City honoring the men and women who fought to help liberate Kuwait from Iraqi control.

More than three months had passed since Iraqis retreated from Kuwait, signifying an American-led victory more than 10 months after the invasion began.

The invasion also led to the most significant spike in oil prices in more than a decade. After oil prices fell over the first half of 1986, they generally remained at prices between $12 and $15 per barrel.

Once Iraq invaded Kuwait, oil prices more than doubled. In three months, according to one estimate, the price of oil jumped from $14 to $31 per barrel. In sa国际传媒官网网页入口, gasoline prices jumped from just under a dollar per gallon to $1.11 by the first weekend in August. And the ripple effect would extend across the city, with higher gasoline prices affecting the budgets of both the sa国际传媒官网网页入口 Police Department and sa国际传媒官网网页入口 Public Schools.

But the price spike did not last long. In fact, although oil prices stayed above $22 per barrel for the month of December 1990, oil traders rang in 1991 with a drop in oil prices. By the time American forces declared victory in Kuwait, oil prices were back to where they were before Iraq invaded Kuwait鈥攁round $15 per barrel.

But the economic ramifications spread far beyond Kuwait 鈥� and they would last at least a quarter of the way through the 1990s.

The oil-price shock allowed producers to discover more oil. The 70.4 million barrels produced in New Mexico in 1991 marked the highest statewide total since the 71.2 million barrels produced three years earlier.

New Mexico oil production would have been higher if not for one other economic factor. As oil prices fell, so, too, did the fortunes of the savings-and-loan operators who had bet on high oil prices to benefit their customers. The fates of oil producers and S&Ls were intertwined.

By the time that the ticker-tape parade took place in New York City, nearly two years had passed since the failure of New Mexico Savings and Loan. It was established in 1961, the third year of a 15-year streak in which New Mexico鈥檚 annual oil production exceeded 100 million barrels. By 1989, the prolific oil production had slid below 70 million barrels. On July 20, federal regulators took over the troubled thrift. The New Mexico Federal Savings Association ran what was formerly New Mexico S&L until selling the more than $250 million in assets to First National Bank of sa国际传媒官网网页入口 more than a year later. Through a series of modern mergers, what remains of New Mexico S&L is now part of BMO Bank.

While Texas had arguably more 鈥� and more well-documented S&L failures 鈥� New Mexico S&L was one of more than 328 thrifts to fail in 1989 alone. The loss of S&Ls meant the loss of financing for oil companies. Without some sort of financing, the drop in oil prices resulted in the failure of more than 5,800 oil companies between 1985 and 1989. Fewer oil companies would be able to drill for more crude. More crude shipments to refineries would mean more gasoline.

As the oil-price shock subsided, a deepening recession persisted over late 1991 and early 1992; at one point, unemployment in New Mexico surpassed 7%.

Thirty-five years after Desert Storm ended, the lesson is this: Oil prices, as high as they are now, will soon fall once again.

Matthew M. Day is  an independent scholar/historian from Lubbock, Texas.  He is the author of 30 books, including 鈥淟ubbock, Levelland, Baghdad, Washington; The Oil Empire That Wasn't Book I,鈥� and 鈥淭he Oil Empire That Wasn't Book II.鈥�  He previously wrote a column for the Seminole (Texas) Sentinel.  His website is .